Dark Mode
Image
Logo
Supreme Court: Mention Of S.307 IPC In FIR Doesn't Bar Quashing Of Case On Settlement If Offence Isn't Made Out From Allegations

Supreme Court: Mention Of S.307 IPC In FIR Doesn't Bar Quashing Of Case On Settlement If Offence Isn't Made Out From Allegations

Pranav B Prem


In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court of India has held that the mere mention of Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) in an FIR does not prevent the High Court from quashing the case based on a settlement if, upon scrutiny, the facts do not support the charge. The judgment, delivered on February 11, 2025, by a bench comprising Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti, set aside an Allahabad High Court order that refused to quash criminal proceedings despite a compromise between the parties.

 

Background of the Case

The appeal was filed by five individuals against the Allahabad High Court’s decision, which dismissed their application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), refusing to quash proceedings against them under Section 307 IPC. The case dated back to an incident on August 11, 1991, involving a dispute over irrigation rights in Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh. Both parties had lodged FIRs against each other, and one of the accused, Abdul Waris, was alleged to have opened fire during the altercation. However, he had since passed away. A compromise was reached between the appellants and the complainant, Mahmood, on December 19, 2022. Despite this, the High Court declined to quash the case, holding that an offence under Section 307 IPC cannot be compounded.

 

Supreme Court’s Observations

The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court had conflated the concepts of compounding of an offence and quashing of proceedings. Referring to Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, the bench reiterated: “Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable.” The Court further elaborated on the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688 and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, stating: “The High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC.” The Court clarified that in cases where the injury is not serious and the circumstances do not justify a charge under Section 307 IPC, the matter can be considered for quashing even if it is a non-compoundable offence.

 

Application of the Law to the Present Case

Analyzing the facts of the case, the Supreme Court found that the invocation of Section 307 IPC was unjustified. The specific act of firing was attributed to Abdul Waris, who had passed away, and the remaining allegations were general and vague. Moreover, the injuries sustained by the complainant, Mahmood, included a fracture of the distal phalanx of the left ring finger, which the Court deemed insufficient to justify a charge under Section 307 IPC. The Court observed: “We are also inclined to conclude that considering the overall circumstances, the nature of the weapon and the nature of the injury (fracture of the head of distal phalanx of left ring finger), the offence alleged, on facts, does not fall in that category of cases where the court should deny relief in the event of a settlement.” The Court held that, at most, the offence could be classified under Section 326 IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means) but did not warrant the continuation of the trial under Section 307 IPC.

 

Impact of Settlement on Criminal Proceedings

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the dispute had been amicably resolved and that proceeding with the trial would amount to an abuse of the judicial process. The bench observed: “Proceeding with the trial, when parties have amicably resolved the dispute in the present case, would be futile and the ends of justice require that the settlement be given effect to by quashing the proceedings.”

 

Referring to Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2022) 14 SCC 531, the Court reiterated: “The extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC.” It was emphasized that factors such as the nature of the offence, the severity of the injury, the voluntary nature of the compromise, and the accused's conduct must be considered when deciding whether to quash proceedings.

 

Verdict

Considering all aspects, the Supreme Court concluded that the case did not warrant further prosecution and allowed the appeal. The Court directed:“Considering the special features of the case and taking the settlement on record and applying the law, we find that this is a fit case where proceedings in complaint case No. 8023 of 2015 arising out of Case Crime No. 248 of 1991 pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.5, Moradabad should be quashed.” Accordingly, the High Court’s decision was set aside, and the criminal proceedings were quashed.

 

 

Cause Title: Naushey Ali & Ors. Versus State of U.P. & Anr.

Citation: 2025 INSC 182

Bench: Justice K.V. Viswanathan, Justice S.V.N. Bhatti

 

 

[Read/Download order]

Comment / Reply From