Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court has quashed the criminal proceedings initiated against a Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) official, stating that the trial court had taken cognizance without obtaining the mandatory prosecution sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The Court observed that the appellant, who had been accused under multiple provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), was performing her official duties as the Presiding Officer of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) at the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI). It was recorded that the competent authority, BIS, had expressly refused to grant sanction for prosecution, rendering the proceedings legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the Court quashed the chargesheet, the summoning order, and all subsequent steps taken against the appellant.

The case originated from an FIR registered on October 30, 2018, at Aliganj Police Station, Lucknow, by a former Associate Director at FSSAI, who alleged that she had been sexually harassed by Dr. S.S. Ghonkrokta, the then Enforcement Director at FSSAI, during her tenure in 2012. An Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) was constituted, and following an inquiry, a report was submitted on June 22, 2015, which found Dr. Ghonkrokta guilty and recommended the registration of an FIR under Sections 354, 509, 192, 197, 204, 218, 202, and 120B IPC. The complainant asserted that since no action was taken by the authorities, she filed an independent FIR against Dr. Ghonkrokta and Sunil Kumar Bhadoria under additional provisions, including Sections 468, 471, and 506 IPC.

The appellant was neither named in the FIR nor mentioned in the complainant’s statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC. However, her name appeared in the complainant’s statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC on October 14, 2020. The allegations against the appellant pertained to her actions as the Presiding Officer of the ICC. The complainant alleged that the appellant had filed a counter affidavit before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) on her behalf without her knowledge or consent and had sought to pressurize her to withdraw the case.

The chargesheet, filed on July 2, 2022, included the appellant as accused number four. The investigating officer sought sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC, but since no response was received within the stipulated period, it was recorded that sanction had been deemed to have been granted. The Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, took cognizance of the chargesheet on October 6, 2022, and issued summons to the accused persons. The appellant, along with two other co-accused, filed a petition before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, seeking the quashing of the chargesheet and summoning order. The High Court dismissed the petition on November 16, 2022, while granting the appellant liberty to approach the trial court and directing that she be released on bail.

The appellant contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court had failed to consider that she was a government servant performing official duties and that her prosecution required prior sanction from BIS. It was submitted that the investigating officer erroneously sought sanction from FSSAI rather than BIS, her parent department, leading to a delay. BIS received the sanction request on July 29, 2022, by which time the chargesheet had already been filed, and the trial court had issued summons. BIS, after reviewing the FIR and chargesheet, communicated through a letter dated November 14, 2022, that sanction for prosecution was not granted, as the appellant was not found to have committed any offence.

The State contended that the time period for granting sanction had lapsed and that proceedings could continue under the doctrine of deemed sanction. It relied on the judgment in Vineet Narain v. Union of India to argue that the stipulated timeframe for sanction must be strictly adhered to. The complainant’s counsel supported this argument, asserting that the appellant had attempted to shield the accused and had committed perjury before the tribunal.

The Supreme Court recorded that sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC was a jurisdictional requirement and that its absence vitiated the entire proceedings. It was observed that “the object and purpose of the said provision is to protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties within the scope and ambit of their powers.” The Court examined the sequence of events and noted that the appellant had acted in her official capacity as Presiding Officer of the ICC. It was further recorded that “the actions of the appellant were performed in the discharge of her official duties, and thus, sanction under Section 197 CrPC was a mandatory prerequisite for prosecution.”

The Court examined the concept of deemed sanction and rejected its applicability in this case. It was observed that “Section 197 of CrPC does not envisage a concept of deemed sanction. The absence of a response from the sanctioning authority within the stipulated time cannot be construed as implied approval for prosecution.” The judgment in Vineet Narain was distinguished, as it dealt with investigation timelines rather than sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC. The Court also referred to Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, clarifying that the guidelines mentioned therein were recommendations for legislative consideration and had not been incorporated into statutory law.

The Court stated established principles governing sanction for prosecution, citing Amod Kumar Kanth v. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy, which recorded that “the question of cognizance being taken in the absence of sanction and thereby Section 197 of the CrPC being flouted is not to be conflated with the question as to whether an offence has been committed.” It was further observed that “when an act is indisputably traceable to the discharge of the official duty by a public servant, then for the Court to not accept the objection against cognizance being taken would clearly defeat the salutary purpose which underlies Section 197 of the CrPC.”

The judgment also referred to Amrik Singh v. State of PEPSU, stating that “whether sanction is necessary to prosecute a public servant depends on whether the acts complained of hinge on his duties as a public servant.”

The Court concluded that the appellant’s role as Presiding Officer of the ICC was directly connected to her official duties and that the absence of sanction for prosecution rendered the proceedings unsustainable. It was recorded that “the necessary sanction not having been granted has vitiated the very initiation of the criminal proceeding against the appellant herein.” Consequently, the Supreme Court quashed the chargesheet, the summoning order, and all further proceedings against the appellant.

Case Title: Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another
Case Number: 2025 INSC 267; SLP (Crl.) No. 6898 of 2023
Bench: Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma

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