Isabella Mariam

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra set aside the dismissal order of a former constable, holding that the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated due to denial of a fair hearing and issuance of vague charges. The Court directed payment of ₹30 lakh as compensation within three months. It also overturned the Division Bench judgment of the Patna High Court that had earlier upheld the dismissal, restoring parts of the Single Judge’s earlier ruling but denying full back wages.

The appellant, a constable in the Dog Squad of the Crime Investigation Department (CID) appointed in 1973, proceeded on two days’ earned leave and was scheduled to resume duty on 8th August 1988. On 7th August 1988, an FIR was registered by informant Prem Kumar Singh alleging extortion and cheating, leading to the formation of a raiding party. On 8th August 1988, while returning to work, the appellant was handed a briefcase by the informant and subsequently arrested.

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The appellant was suspended on the same day. On 14th June 1989, disciplinary proceedings commenced with a memorandum of charges accusing the appellant of: (i) receiving ₹40,000 by impersonation and extortion, (ii) a prior 1976 cheating incident, (iii) unauthorized absence post-leave, and (iv) failure to inform CID Headquarters about his arrest.

Despite seeking postponement of the departmental inquiry until the conclusion of criminal proceedings to avoid prejudicing his defense, the inquiry proceeded. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report on 3rd May 1995 finding the appellant guilty. A second show-cause notice was issued, and after considering the appellant’s reply, the Superintendent of Police, CID, dismissed him from service on 21st June 1996. Payment during the suspension was also denied, save for amounts already disbursed.

Meanwhile, the trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 384 and 411 of the Indian Penal Code, sentencing him to one-year simple imprisonment. However, upon appeal, the Additional Sessions Judge-XI, Patna, acquitted him on 16th February 1996 due to lack of evidence.

Following dismissal, the appellant's appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police and a revision before the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, CID were dismissed. A writ petition was filed before the Patna High Court.

The Single Judge of the High Court found that the inquiry had procedural lapses, including denial of the right to cross-examine a key witness (PW-1) and reliance on vague charges. Observing inconsistencies in the informant’s narrative and procedural unfairness, the Single Judge quashed the dismissal order and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits.

Aggrieved, the respondents preferred an intra-court appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court reversed the Single Judge’s decision, observing that judicial review should be confined to the decision-making process and should not involve re-appreciation of evidence. It found the charges specific and the procedural requirements properly followed, dismissing the writ petition.

The appellant approached the Supreme Court challenging the Division Bench’s ruling. Contentions advanced included claims of procedural unfairness, denial of cross-examination, vague charges, personal animosity from witnesses, prior punishment on a repeated charge constituting double jeopardy, and the impact of acquittal in the criminal proceedings.

The respondents defended the departmental inquiry process, contending that the appellant was afforded opportunities, that departmental and criminal proceedings could proceed independently, and that the Single Judge had wrongly assumed appellate jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court recorded: “Based on the foregoing discussion, the version of the appellant that the charges drawn up against him were vague, indefinite, unspecific and lacked essential particulars has to be accepted.” It further stated: “The decision of this Court in Sawai Singh (supra), thus, does apply on all fours in this case.”

On denial of cross-examination rights, the Court stated: “Preponderance of probability favours the appellant for a finding to be returned that he was denied his right to cross-examine PW-1.”

Regarding the credibility of witnesses, the Court noted: “Findings had to be returned by [the Inquiry Officer] neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and conjectures but on the basis of legal evidence.” Citing Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, the Court held that production of a document does not constitute proof unless the author is examined.

Discussing the non-production of departmental records despite Court orders, the Court invoked adverse inference, stating: “The presumption that can legitimately and validly be drawn and which we do hereby draw is that the respondents did not deliberately produce the departmental file lest the illegality in proceeding against the appellant from the inception is exposed.”

Assessing the parallel nature of departmental and criminal proceedings, the Court recorded: “We hold that the finding of the appellant being guilty of charge no.1 cannot be sustained following his acquittal in the criminal proceedings, which seem to have involved substantially similar or identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances.”

It rejected the respondents’ contention that the disciplinary charges were distinct, highlighting that the allegations, witnesses, and evidence were substantially identical. The Court criticized the Inquiry Officer for relying on conjectures and the Division Bench for failing to detect procedural vices.

The Court remarked: “The disciplinary proceedings had not been conducted against the appellant in tune with principles of fairness as well as natural justice which severely prejudiced his defence.”

The Supreme Court directed: “The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 16th November, 2016 is set aside together with the orders dated 21st June, 1996, 14th July, 1997, and 6th August, 2003, issued by the respondents 5, 4, and 2, respectively.”

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It further ruled: “The order passed by the Single Judge dated 16th July, 2013 is partly upheld. The direction for release of full back wages is, however, set aside.”

Considering the passage of time and the appellant’s advanced age, the Court stated: “Ends of justice would be sufficiently served if we direct payment of a lumpsum compensation of ₹30 lakh (Rupees thirty lakh) to the appellant inclusive of all service and retiral benefits by the respondents within three months from date.”

In addition, the Court ordered: “The appellant shall be entitled to costs assessed at ₹5 lakh (Rupees five lakh), to be paid by the respondents within the aforesaid period.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Appellant: Ms. Rohini Prasad, Advocate-on-Record (AOR)
For the Respondents: Mr. Samir Ali Khan, Advocate-on-Record (AOR); Mr. Pranjal Sharma, Advocate; Mr. Kashif Irshad Khan, Advocate; Mr. Anil Verma, Advocate

Case Title: Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 554
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 5497 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9818/2017)
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

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