Supreme Court Restores CISF Constable’s Dismissal For Second Marriage Under CISF Rules, 2001
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi has allowed the Union of India’s appeal and restored the dismissal of a Central Industrial Security Force constable, setting aside the High Court’s directions for imposition of a lesser penalty. The Court held that the High Court exceeded the permissible scope of interference in disciplinary proceedings after the punishment had been affirmed by the departmental appellate and revisional authorities. The dispute arose from disciplinary action initiated on allegations that the constable contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage, leading to his dismissal from service. With the High Court orders set aside, the dismissal order passed by the disciplinary authorities stands revived.
The respondent, a CISF constable appointed on 22 July 2006, faced departmental action after the authorities received a written complaint dated 18 March 2016 from his wife alleging that he had contracted a second marriage while his first marriage subsisted.
Based on the complaint and an examination by the competent authority, a charge memorandum dated 7 July 2016 was issued. The first charge alleged that, despite having a living spouse, he married another woman on 14 March 2016 during a posting at the 3rd NDRF Battalion, and thereby violated Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, 2001. A second charge alleged neglect of his wife and minor daughter, with the complaint also alleging physical torture and that they were asked to leave the matrimonial home.
An Enquiry Officer was appointed and submitted a report dated 19 May 2017 noting, among other aspects, the date of the first marriage (13 March 2006), the couple’s daughter (born 19 April 2008), and the respondent’s statement regarding the circumstances in which the second relationship was taken forward. The report also recorded that the wife left the matrimonial home on 17 March 2016 and that the respondent stated he sent her money, in small amounts and at intervals.
The disciplinary authority dismissed the respondent from service on 1 July 2017, and the dismissal was affirmed in departmental appeal and revision. The High Court, in separate proceedings before a Single Judge and then a Division Bench, directed reconsideration of the penalty on the ground that dismissal was excessive, following which the Union of India pursued an appeal.
The Court observed: “It is important to observe that such Rules are premised on an institutional requirement for all members of the force(s) to maintain the highest standards of discipline, public confidence and integrity. It is generally understood that acts, whether in personal or professional life, if they involve the possibility of domestic discord, financial vulnerability or divided responsibilities, they have the potential to adversely impact operational efficacy given mental/psychological stability is key. It is also to be noted that these rules are not a moral censure, but simply a service condition, which, it need not be stated, an employer is perfectly within their rights to prescribe, so long as such conditions are not arbitrary, disproportionate or violative of constitutional protections, which in any event stand taken before us. For instance, where the personal law applicable to a service member permits either polygamy or polyandry or the first marriage of such a service member was void, voidable or the like, then, regulation by the employer without due regard therefor would step into the undesirable realms of overregulation, removed from the paramount interests of service discipline.”
The Court observed: “It has long been held that under Article 226 jurisdiction, the court is not akin to an appellate Court, its powers are limited to the extent of judicial review. They cannot set aside punishment or impose a different punishment unless they find that there is substantial non-compliance of the rules. Reference was made to the precedents “B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, Union of India v. K.G. Soni:”
The Court stated: “We say so for the reason that clause 18-B is a close prescribing penal consequences for an action and it is trite in law that any provision of law or rule framed under a statute prescribing penal consequences, has to be strictly construed for the conditions that can trigger such a clause must be flowing from the words employed therein. It is also settled that when such a rule presents any ambiguity, the interpretation which favours the person sought to be penalised, is to be preferred. In the instant case, it cannot be said that there is any ambiguity. The words of the clause are clear. There is no averment as to the proper procedure not been followed in the disciplinary proceedings. The maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard, but it is the law” is attracted in this case. Inconvenience or unpleasant consequences of violation of law cannot detract from the prescription of the law.”
The Court directed: “Consequently, we set aside the impugned judgment, and restore the findings of the disciplinary authority, as confirmed by the Appellate and Revisional authorities. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, no order is required to be passed on cost. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.”
Case Title: Union of India & Ors. Versus Pranab Kumar Nath
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1479
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 15068 of 2025 (@Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18702 of 2023)
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
