Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Aravind Kumar has set aside the retirement of a driver declared colour blind by the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC) and directed his reinstatement with full-service continuity and partial arrears. The court held that the respondent corporation had failed to discharge its obligation to consider the possibility of alternative employment for the appellant, despite a binding industrial settlement providing for such an option. It stated that such inaction amounted to a "substantive illegality" and a violation of both statutory rights and constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity.

The Bench directed the reinstatement of the appellant to a suitable post consistent with his medical condition, on the same pay grade held at the time of retirement, and ordered payment of 25% of arrears of salary and service benefits. The judgment also rejected the respondent's reliance on internal circulars and a subsequent settlement, affirming the binding nature of the earlier settlement executed under the Industrial Disputes Act.

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The appellant was appointed as a driver with the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) on 01.05.2014 after meeting all eligibility criteria. Following the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh, the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC) became the relevant entity. During a routine medical examination, the appellant was found to be colour blind and declared unfit to serve as a driver.

Challenging this assessment, the appellant filed an appeal and also requested alternative employment in case of being found medically unfit. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal, and a further request for review by the Medical Board also upheld the initial finding. Consequently, TSRTC issued an order dated 27.01.2016 retiring the appellant from service with effect from 06.01.2016, offering him additional monetary benefits in accordance with policy.

The appellant approached the High Court challenging the retirement order, seeking a direction for alternative employment. He contended that his condition fell within the meaning of "disability" under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, and invoked Section 47 of the Act. The appellant also referred to Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) dated 17.12.1979, entered into under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, between APSRTC and recognised unions, which expressly provided for alternative employment to colour blind drivers with pay protection.

The single judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition. However, the Division Bench reversed the decision, relying on the judgment in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. B.S. Reddy, and directed the appellant to make a representation to the corporation under applicable regulations.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant reiterated the enforceability of Clause 14 of the 1979 settlement and relied on precedents, including Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Mohamed Ibrahim v. Chairman and Managing Director, which recognized the obligation to provide alternative employment to employees acquiring disability during service.

The respondent-corporation contended that the 1979 MOS had been superseded by a 1986 settlement which altered the provision regarding alternate employment, replacing it with a clause that only obligated the corporation to identify suitable posts "to the extent possible" and otherwise provide additional monetary benefits.

It was further argued that colour blindness did not constitute a disability under Section 2(i) of the 1995 Act, as it did not meet the 40% threshold to qualify as a person with disability. The corporation also claimed that the appellant, being uneducated and lacking qualifications, could not be accommodated in any alternative post.

The corporation submitted that it had acted as per internal circulars issued in 2014 and 2015, which excluded colour blind drivers from being eligible for reassignment and mandated retirement with benefits instead. The respondent also pointed to a policy for providing employment to family members of medically retired workers, which was made available to the appellant.

The Supreme Court framed four issues for consideration:

1. Whether the retirement was legally sustainable in light of service regulations and binding settlements.

2. Whether Clause 14 of the 1979 MOS remained valid and enforceable despite the 1986 MOS and internal circulars.

3. Whether the respondents made a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options.

4. Whether reliance on S. Reddy was valid in the context of the appellant’s rights under the industrial settlement.

The Bench recorded that "the Appellant’s retirement from service on the ground of colour blindness was effected without any demonstrable effort by the Respondent–Corporation to identify or assess the feasibility of alternative employment, despite the Appellant having expressed willingness to be reassigned to a non-driving post." The Court found that such inaction "violates both statutory obligation and administrative fairness."

The Court stated that "Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, specifically provides for alternate employment to drivers declared colour blind, with pay protection and continuity of service." It held that "this clause remains valid and enforceable."

It rejected the respondent's contention that the 1986 settlement had superseded the 1979 settlement. The judgment recorded: "The subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986 neither expressly overrides nor impliedly nullifies the 1979 settlement. Both settlements operate harmoniously, with the latter being general in scope and the former addressing a specific category of disability."

The Court clarified that "internal circulars issued by the Corporation in 2014 and 2015, which purport to deny alternate employment to colour-blind drivers, are administrative instructions that cannot override binding service conditions created by a statutory settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act."

On the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S. Reddy, the Court observed: "The Division Bench of the High Court erred in applying the judgment in B.S. Reddy, which dealt with the limited scope of Section 47 of the Act, and did not consider claims arising independently under industrial settlements. The present case stands on an entirely different legal footing."

Further, the Bench noted: "The Settlement dated 22.12.1986 does not specifically supersede the settlement agreement of 17.12.1979... Clause 5(d) of the 1986 agreement supports the requirement to explore alternative jobs to the extent possible."

The Court also drew from Kunal Singh and Mohamed Ibrahim to affirm that reasonable accommodation must be extended even in cases not explicitly covered under disability statutes, especially when the disability is acquired during service. It stated: "The law does not permit the severance of service by the stroke of a medical certificate without first exhausting the possibility of meaningful redeployment."

The Bench concluded that "Retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues for redeployment. This principle is inherent in the concept of 'reasonable accommodation', which is now recognised as an aspect of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21."

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The Court concluded that "the judgment of the High Court in W.A. No. 1343 of 2017 is set aside." It directed that "the Respondent–Corporation is directed to appoint the Appellant to a suitable post, consistent with his condition, and on the same pay grade as he held on 06.01.2016, within eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order."

Further, the Court held that "the Appellant shall be entitled to 25% of the arrears of salary, allowances, and benefits from the date of his termination to the date of reinstatement." It also directed that "the intervening period shall be reckoned as continuous service for all purposes."

The appeal was accordingly allowed, with the operative portion concluding: "There shall be no order as to costs."

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioner: Mr. C. Mohan Rao, Senior Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Satyam Reddy Sarasani, Senior Advocate

Case Title: Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Others

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 920

Case Number: Civil Appeal No(s). of 2025 (@ SLP (C) No. 36278 of 2017)

Bench: Justice J.K. Maheshwari, Justice Aravind Kumar