Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court Division Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Alok Aradhe on Friday (October 10) observed that the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), under Section 15(6)(a) and (b) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, is empowered to substitute the findings of a Court Martial and interfere with the sentence if found excessive, illegal, or unjust. Upholding the AFT’s authority, the Bench sustained its decision to set aside the court-martial’s order of dismissal against a former Army officer and replace it with compulsory retirement, granting him pensionary benefits, while affirming that the Tribunal had acted within its statutory powers.

The appellant, a Colonel in the Army Ordnance Corps, was serving as Commandant of the Northern Command Vehicle Depot, Udhampur, when he was accused of demanding ₹100 per motorcycle from a contractor for clearing inspection tests. Acting on a complaint, a search was conducted in his office on 27 September 2008. A sum of ₹10,000 allegedly paid as bribe and ₹28,000 in cash were recovered along with ammunition comprising rounds of 7.62 mm and 9 mm calibre.

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He was tried by a General Court Martial (GCM) on three charges: (i) criminal misconduct under Section 5(2) of the J&K Prevention of Corruption Act, 2006, read with Section 69 of the Army Act; (ii) possession of ammunition without authority under Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959; and (iii) possession of unexplained cash under Section 63 of the Army Act. The GCM convicted him on the first two charges, acquitting him of the third, and ordered his dismissal from service.

His pre- and post-confirmation petitions to the competent authority were rejected, leading to an appeal before the Armed Forces Tribunal. The Tribunal found no evidence of bribe demand or acceptance and held that the Arms Act charge was unsustainable but substituted the conviction under Section 63 for an act prejudicial to good order and discipline, imposing compulsory retirement with pensionary benefits. The appellant’s review plea was dismissed, prompting the present appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal was empowered under Section 15(6)(a) and (b) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, to substitute the findings of a Court Martial if the evidence supported conviction for another cognate offence. “Section 15(6) is in pari materia with Section 162 of the Army Act and akin to Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, permitting conviction for a lesser or related offence on the same facts,” the Court stated.

The Bench noted that concurrent findings of fact established recovery of ammunition from the appellant’s office through the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and material exhibits. “The factual foundation brought on record at the trial clearly discloses an act or omission on the part of the appellant which is prejudicial to good order and military discipline,” the Court recorded. It further observed that the Tribunal had “taken a lenient view in favour of the appellant and modified the punishment from dismissal to compulsory retirement with all retiral benefits.”

The judgment clarified that the appellate jurisdiction under Section 30 of the 2007 Act is limited, and interference is justified only if the order is arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. “The Tribunal has exercised its discretion in a manner both just and proportionate, balancing the disciplinary needs of service with fairness to the individual,” the Court noted, concluding that the Tribunal’s findings and substituted punishment were lawful and proportionate.

The Court concluded: “We do not find any merit in this appeal. In the result, same fails and is hereby dismissed.” It held that the Tribunal had acted “strictly within the statutory framework” in substituting the conviction and modifying the punishment. The Bench affirmed that “the Tribunal, on the established fact of recovery of ammunition from the possession of the appellant, has rightly exercised its power under Section 15(6) of the 2007 Act.”

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“The Tribunal has taken a lenient view in favour of the appellant and has modified the punishment from dismissal to compulsory retirement with all pensionary and retiral benefits.” Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere, stating that the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal did not warrant appellate correction.

Thus, the appeal was dismissed, and the Tribunal’s order dated 01 June 2012 and review order dated 03 September 2012 were upheld in full effect.

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Appellant: Mr. Sudhanshu S. Pandey, Adv. Mr. Gaichangpou Gangmei, AOR Mr. Roshan Kumar, Adv. Mr. Maitreya Mahaley, Adv. Mr. Yimyanger Longkumer, Adv. Ms. Darshana Deepak Das, Adv. Mr. Kamei Bestman Kabui, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. Brijender Chahar, A.S.G. Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR Mr. Praneet Pranav, Adv. Mr. Amit Sharma B, Adv. Mr. Ishaan Sharma, Adv. Mr. Raman Yadav, Adv.

Case Title: S.K. Jain v. Union of India & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1215
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 628 of 2016
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Alok Aradhe