Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court has allowed the eviction of tenants from a disputed residential property, holding that the landlord’s requirement for the premises constituted a bona fide need. The Court recorded that the landlord sought eviction to establish an ultrasound machine for the benefit of his two unemployed sons and had provided evidence supporting his capacity to do so. The Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the First Appellate Court, restoring the eviction decree granted by the Trial Court. The Court held that the landlord was the best judge of his needs and that the tenant could not dictate which property should be used for a specific purpose.

The dispute arose over a house situated on Holding No. 80, New Ward No. X (Old Ward No. IV, Old Holding No. 211) of Chatra Municipality, Jharkhand. The appellant, as the landlord and owner, had filed Eviction Suit No. 25 of 2001 against the tenants on the ground of default in rent payment and the requirement of the property for the establishment of an ultrasound machine for his two unemployed sons. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court on July 15, 2006, on the ground of bona fide need. The Trial Court found that the landlord had established his financial capacity to purchase the ultrasound machine, had proven an annual income of Rs. 4,00,000, and had demonstrated that the suit premises was an appropriate location due to its proximity to a medical clinic and pathology center. The claim of eviction on the ground of rent default was rejected.

The tenants challenged the decision before the First Appellate Court, which reversed the Trial Court’s findings. The High Court subsequently affirmed the decision of the First Appellate Court in Second Appeal No. 317 of 2006. The landlord, aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dated August 18, 2022, filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

The appellant confined his claim before the Supreme Court to the issue of eviction on the ground of bona fide need. The contention of the appellant’s counsel was that the First Appellate Court and the High Court had erred in holding that the landlord failed to prove the need for the premises. It was submitted that the requirement of technical expertise for running an ultrasound machine was irrelevant, as such machines were generally operated by technicians or medical professionals employed for the purpose. The appellant further contended that a previous partial eviction from the premises in Eviction Suit No. 11 of 1981 did not affect the bona fide nature of the present eviction suit, as the earlier eviction was for the benefit of a different family member and did not pertain to the appellant’s sons.

The respondents argued that in the earlier eviction suit, a compromise had been reached, allowing the tenants to occupy three pucca rooms as tenants in perpetuity. It was contended that the present suit for eviction was not maintainable in light of this compromise. The respondents further submitted that the appellant had sufficient alternative accommodation and did not require the premises for personal use. It was asserted that the landlord had previously obtained eviction on the ground of necessity but had later let out the vacated portion to another tenant at a higher rent, which raised doubts about the genuineness of his need.

The Supreme Court examined the legal principles governing eviction on the ground of bona fide need. The Court recorded that “the need has to be a real one rather than a mere desire to get the premises vacated. The landlord is the best judge to decide which of his properties should be vacated for satisfying his particular need. The tenant has no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord should get vacated for his need alleged in the suit for eviction.”

The Court observed that “the appellant-landlord may be having some other properties under tenancy of various persons, but once he has decided to get the suit premises vacated for the bona fide need of establishing an ultrasound machine for his two unemployed sons, he cannot be forced to initiate such a proceeding against the other tenants.” The Court recorded that “no error or illegality could be pointed out in the appellant’s decision to seek eviction from the present premises, particularly when the Trial Court had found it to be the most suitable location for establishing an ultrasound machine.”

Addressing the respondents' argument that the appellant’s sons lacked expertise to operate an ultrasound machine, the Court recorded that “it is common knowledge that these days medical devices such as ultrasound machines are installed and established and are ordinarily run by the technicians or the medical experts who are engaged for the said purpose.” The Court held that the lack of technical expertise by the landlord’s sons was not a valid ground for rejecting the eviction claim.

The Court examined the compromise reached in the previous eviction suit and recorded that “there is no clause in the compromise deed which stipulates that the appellant-landlord will not initiate any proceeding for eviction against the respondents-tenant in future.” It further observed that “such a compromise does not intend to take away the right of the landlord to initiate eviction proceedings against the tenant if he defaults in payment of rent, makes material alterations damaging the property or otherwise ceases to use the same for his benefit and lets it out to an outsider.” The Court held that the present eviction suit was maintainable and not barred by the previous compromise.

The Court recorded that “the decree for partial eviction from the premises occupied by the respondents-tenant was partially decreed in Second Appeal No. 40 of 1983 on 31.03.1988 for the bona fide need of the appellant-landlord to establish his brother-in-law.” It was noted that “the need in the earlier suit was altogether different from the present suit, which was instituted in 2001 for the purpose of establishing the appellant’s unemployed sons.” The Court held that the earlier decree did not affect the appellant’s right to seek eviction in the present suit.

The Supreme Court found that the appellant had established his need for the premises. The Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and the First Appellate Court and restored the decree passed by the Trial Court. It was recorded that “the appeal is allowed, and the impugned judgment and order dated 18.08.2022 and 25.09.2006 of the High Court and the First Appellate Court respectively are set aside. The suit of the appellant-landlord stands decreed.”

Case Title: Kanhaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehshan & Ors.
Case Number: 025 INSC 271; SLP (C) No. 21965 of 2022
Bench: Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

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