Third Party Can Sue In Deity’s Name Only In Exceptional Cases Where Sebait Is Disabled: Calcutta High Court
Sanchayita Lahkar
The High Court of Calcutta, Division Bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya dismissed writ challenges to a land reforms tribunal order after finding that the person and committee claiming to act for a Hindu deity lacked authority to sue in the deity’s name. The dispute concerned debottar land and competing claims over correction of records as raiyats, alongside private parties’ assertion of rights over the same plots. The Bench observed that, as a rule, the sebait represents the deity, and a third party can litigate in the deity’s name only in exceptional situations where the lawful sebait has ceased or disabled himself from exercising that power.
The dispute arose from two writ petitions filed before the High Court of Calcutta challenging a common judgment of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal. One petition was filed in the name of a Hindu deity through a committee claiming to manage its affairs, while the other was filed by the committee president in his individual capacity. The petitioners sought a direction upon the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer to consider a representation for recording their name as raiyat in respect of certain disputed plots.
Also Read: Supreme Court Urges Govts To Digitize Land Records Using Tamper-Proof Technology Like Blockchain
Parallelly, private respondents had approached the Tribunal seeking a declaration that the subject plots had not vested in the State, confirmation of their raiyati status, and protection of possession. The Tribunal dismissed the application filed by the committee on the ground of lack of locus standi, while granting limited relief to the private respondents by holding that the land had not vested in the State.
Before the High Court, the petitioners contended that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding locus standi at the threshold and that, under Hindu law, debottar property could not be alienated without court permission. The State and private respondents supported the Tribunal’s decision, contending that the petitioners had no legally established authority to represent the deity.
The Division Bench examined whether the petitioners possessed the legal capacity to represent the deity or maintain proceedings relating to the debottar property. The Court noted that “the sole straw on which the petitioner… premises his arguments is that he is apparently the president of a registered society, a committee, which is a self-proclaimed sebait of the deity-in-question.”
It recorded that the records of rights showed the deity, represented by the settlor and a named sebait, as the raiyat of the subject property and clarified that “the user by the general public was restricted not to the usufructs of the property but only to specific user of the water body.” The Court stated that such use “is in the nature of an easement right and does not create any title.”
Relying on settled Hindu law principles, the Bench observed that “according to Hindu law, it is the sebait who represents the deity and he alone is competent to institute a suit in the name of the deity.” It further noted that a third party could act only in exceptional circumstances and only upon court appointment, recording that “there is nothing on record to indicate that any such appointment was made by any competent court.”
The Court also recorded that the property was “in the nature of a private debottar property and not a public debottar property.” It concluded that unless the threshold requirement of locus standi was satisfied, “it is beyond the scope of the writ court or of the Tribunal to adjudicate on the merits of the other questions.”
The Division Bench recorded: “we concur with the conclusion of the Tribunal on such count as well. It is well within the domain of a Tribunal to assess whether a representation, regarding which direction for adjudication is sought, is maintainable in the first place.”
The Bench noted that such an exercise is required to be undertaken “at least at a prima facie level by the Tribunal to ascertain as to whether any direction on the concerned authority to consider a representation would be a futile exercise. Instead of generating a futile exercise by directing the representation to be considered at the behest of a person who has no locus standi,” the Tribunal was justified in declining to issue such a direction.
The Court directed that “we do not find any excessive exercise of jurisdiction or illegality on the part of the Tribunal in passing the impugned judgment.” Consequently, it ordered that “WPLRT 209 of 2025 and WPLRT 220 of 2025 are dismissed on contest without any order as to costs,” thereby “affirming the impugned judgment of the Third Bench, West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Sounak Bhattacharyya, Ms. Sangeeta Roy, Mr. Chandra Prakash, Ms. Monalisa Maity
For the Respondents: Mr. Sk. Md. Galib, Mr. Abu Siddik Mallick, Mr. Kapil Guha, Mr. Ayan Banerjee, Ms. Debasree Dhamali, Ms. Riya Ghosh, Ms. Debolina Ghosh
Case Title: Sri Sri Dodhimohan Jew v. State of West Bengal & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2026: CHC-AS:100-DB
Case Numbers: W.P.L.R.T. 209 of 2025, W.P.L.R.T. 220 of 2025
Comment / Reply From
Related Posts
Stay Connected
Newsletter
Subscribe to our mailing list to get the new updates!
