Withholding Without Returning Defies Federalism; Governor Cannot Keep Bill Pending Without Sending It Back To Assembly: Supreme Court In Presidential Reference
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India Constitution Bench of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice Surya Kant, Justice Vikram Nath, Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, while answering a Presidential Reference, held that a Governor cannot keep a Bill pending without returning it to the State Legislature, as the Constitution does not provide a standalone power to withhold assent. The Court clarified that Article 200 obliges the Governor either to assent, return the Bill with a message, or reserve it for Presidential consideration, and that any interpretation permitting prolonged inaction would undermine the constitutional scheme.
The Presidential Reference placed before the Supreme Court sought clarity on the constitutional options available to a Governor when a Bill is presented under Article 200. The questions were prompted by concerns regarding the absence of prescribed timelines for the Governor and the President, the scope of their discretionary powers, and differing judicial views on matters such as withholding of assent, reservation, and the possibility of deemed assent.
During the proceedings, parties advanced competing interpretations of Article 200. Arguments were presented asserting that the Governor’s discretionary space was preserved in the substantive text of Article 200, while others contended that the Governor functions as a formal head bound by ministerial advice. Submissions were also made regarding the historical evolution of the Governor’s role under prior legislative frameworks.
One set of submissions argued that returning the Bill to the Legislature constituted an additional fourth option distinct from assent, withholding assent, or reservation, since the returning step appeared only in the first proviso and not in the main clause of Article 200. Other submissions maintained that withholding simpliciter remained available to the Governor in the substantive provision. The Court recorded these positions, including the contention that “even a Money Bill could be withheld simpliciter”, a view the Bench later rejected.
Opposing arguments stated that the Governor could not indefinitely withhold a Bill and that the first proviso mandated a process of returning the Bill with comments for reconsideration. It was submitted that after the Legislature passed the Bill again, with or without amendments, the Governor was required to assent. The reference also included submissions describing the dialogic process in the proviso as a mechanism ensuring cooperative federal functioning and institutional comity between the Governor and the Legislature.
The Court examined the federal implications of allowing a Governor to withhold a Bill without engaging the reconsideration mechanism prescribed in the first proviso to Article 200. After reviewing prior decisions that recognised federalism as part of the Constitution’s basic structure, the Bench stated that “it would be against the principle of federalism and a derogation of the powers of the State legislatures, to permit the Governor to withhold a Bill without following the dialogic process in the first proviso to Article 200.”
The Court examined the limitations of the Governor’s authority under Article 200 and addressed the argument that a Bill may be withheld without returning it to the Legislature. The Bench stated that “There is significant reason why there cannot exist a simpliciter power of withholding, dehors the mandate to return the Bill to the House with comments.” It recorded that the Constitution denies the Governor the ability to return a Money Bill, noting: “The first proviso disentitles the Governor from returning the Bill to the House in case it is a Money Bill. Therefore, in case of a Money Bill the Governor's option is limited to either assenting to the Bill or reserving it to the President.” It added that interpreting the substantive provision to allow withholding in all cases “defies constitutional logic.”
The Court also reflected on the structural role of the first proviso to Article 200. It observed that “the first proviso initiating a constitutional conversation between the institution of the Governor and the House (or Houses), and the option to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President under the substantive part of Article 200, exemplify the cooperative spirit of Indian federalism, and also bring out different facets of the checks-and-balances model that the Constitution has envisaged.” The Bench stated that the traditional notion of checks and balances must evolve, noting: “We are accustomed to the traditional view of checks-and-balances, where the decision taken by one institution or branch is set at naught by the other. In our considered opinion, this understanding must give way to a more nuanced one.”
Expanding on this constitutional design, the Court wrote: “A dialogic process, which has the potential to understand and reflect on conflicting or opposing perspectives, to reconcile and to move forward in a constructive manner, is an equally potent check-and-balance system that the Constitution has prescribed.” It concluded that constitutional functionaries must internalise this cooperative dynamic, noting that “dialogue, reconciliation and balance, and not obstructionism is the essence of constitutionalism that we practice in this Republic.”
The Court concluded that a Governor has only three constitutionally permissible courses when presented with a Bill: to grant assent, to return it to the Legislature with a message after withholding assent, or to reserve it for the President’s consideration. It held that a Governor cannot simply withhold assent without initiating the reconsideration process mandated in the first proviso to Article 200. The Bench clarified that the Constitution does not recognise any form of deemed assent; a Bill attains legal force only through explicit assent by the Governor or, where applicable, the President. The Court further determined that no judicially imposed timelines can be read into Articles 200 or 201 for the Governor or the President to act. Finally, it held that decisions made under these Articles are not open to judicial review at the pre-enactment stage, before the Bill becomes law.
Case Title: Re: In Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1333
Case Number: Special Reference No. 1 of 2025
Bench: Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice Surya Kant, Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Comment / Reply From
Related Posts
Stay Connected
Newsletter
Subscribe to our mailing list to get the new updates!
