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Writ Under Article 32 Cannot Be Used to Challenge Our Own Judgments’: Supreme Court Dismisses Plea Against Pension Cut-Off, Upholds 2004 Notification

Writ Under Article 32 Cannot Be Used to Challenge Our Own Judgments’: Supreme Court Dismisses Plea Against Pension Cut-Off, Upholds 2004 Notification

Kiran Raj

 

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising of Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dipankar Datta, and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan dismissed a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Himachal Pradesh Government’s 2004 repeal of a pension scheme applicable to corporate sector employees. The Court upheld the finality of its earlier ruling in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, affirming the cut-off date of December 2, 2004, and ruled that the present petition was not maintainable. It held that judicial determinations cannot be re-litigated through a fresh writ once finality has been attained through due process. The petition was accordingly dismissed without costs.

 

The petitioners, retired employees of the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited, approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking parity in pensionary benefits with other similarly situated employees who had retired between April 1, 1999, and December 2, 2004. Their claim was based on the Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 (“1999 Scheme”), which had been introduced by the State Government on October 29, 1999, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1999.

 

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The scheme aligned pensionary benefits of corporate sector employees with those of State Government employees, adopting the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 and the Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981. Employees who opted into the scheme were required to forgo the employer’s contribution to their Contributory Provident Fund (CPF), which would instead be transferred to a government-administered pension corpus.

 

The petitioners had exercised their option in favour of the 1999 Scheme, having joined the Corporation between 1975 and 1988 and retired after the cut-off date of December 2, 2004. They claimed entitlement under the scheme, asserting a vested right to pensionary benefits.

 

In light of financial concerns raised by a High-Level Committee constituted by the State Government in 2003, the scheme was repealed through a notification dated December 2, 2004. The repeal preserved benefits only for those who had retired between April 1, 1999 and December 2, 2004, while employees retiring after this date were excluded.

 

Several employees had earlier challenged the repeal before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, which ruled in their favour in P.D. Nanda v. State of H.P., declaring the cut-off date ultra vires. However, the Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood (2016) reversed the High Court's decision and upheld the validity of the cut-off, citing financial unviability and policy prerogatives.

 

In the present writ petition, the petitioners contended that the Rajesh Chander Sood decision was rendered per incuriam, ignoring binding precedent, and argued that the repeal unreasonably classified similarly situated employees, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. They submitted that the right to pension was a vested and statutory right forming part of their property under Article 300A.

 

The State opposed the petition, arguing that all the issues raised had already been settled in Rajesh Chander Sood, which had binding effect. It maintained that the 1999 Scheme was introduced as a welfare measure, not as a contractual entitlement, and its repeal was justified on financial and administrative grounds.

 

The State also submitted that the present writ petition constituted a collateral challenge to a binding judgment of the Court and was not maintainable under Article 32.

 

The Court recorded that the 1999 Scheme had indeed been introduced as a welfare measure and that the State had acted upon the recommendation of a High-Level Committee which found the scheme financially unsustainable. It noted that: “It is apparent that out of 17 corporations/boards who were invited to express their views on the issue, only 7 had actually done so. It is not the case of the respondent employees that any one of those who had expressed their views, contested the fact that the pension scheme was not self-financing.”

 

On the validity of the cut-off date, the Court referred to its prior ruling in Rajesh Chander Sood, stating: “A cut-off date can, therefore, legitimately be prescribed for extending pensionary benefits, if the funds available cannot assuage the liability, to all the existing pensioners.”

 

Rejecting the petitioners’ plea of promissory estoppel, the Court recorded: “We are of the considered view that the principle of estoppel/promissory estoppel cannot be invoked at the hands of the respondent employees, in the facts and circumstances of this case.”

 

Addressing the argument that the prior judgment was per incuriam, the Court held: “Merely because according to the petitioners the reasons given in the judgment while accepting the stand of the State may not be in sync with previous decisions, it cannot be said to be a judgment rendered per incuriam.”

 

The Court also discussed the finality of judicial decisions and the maintainability of writs under Article 32 to challenge such decisions. It stated: “Finality of a lis is a core facet of a sound judicial system. Litigation which had concluded or had reached finality cannot be reopened.”

 

It further stated: “The present writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is wholly misconceived. The decision of this Court in Rajesh Chander Sood is clearly binding on the petitioners.”

 

The Court held that the decision in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood continues to be binding and that the petitioners, being similarly situated to the employees in that case, are not entitled to re-agitate the same issues. The contention that the earlier decision was rendered per incuriam was rejected.

 

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Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that it constituted a collateral challenge to a judgment already delivered by the Supreme Court, which had attained finality. The Court reiterated that any grievance regarding such a decision must be addressed through review or curative proceedings, not by way of a writ under Article 32.

 

The Court stated that since the petitioners were senior citizens and retired employees, it would refrain from imposing any costs. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed without costs.

 

Advocates Representing the Parties:
For the Petitioners: Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Senior Advocate; Mr. Anand Varma, Advocate-on-Record; Ms. Adyasha Nanda and Ms. Aditi Gupta, Advocates.
For the Respondents: Mr. Devadatt Kamat, Senior Advocate; Mr. Anubhav Sharma, Ms. Shalya Agarwal, and Mr. Gopal Prasad, Advocates; Mr. Nishant Kumar, Advocate-on-Record.

 


Case Title: Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 491
Case Number: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 179 of 2018
Bench: Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dipankar Datta, and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

 

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