Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice N Kotiswar Singh and Justice Manmohan held that taking photographs or recording videos of a woman on a mobile phone without her consent, when she is not engaged in a private act, does not amount to voyeurism under Section 354C of the IPC. Applying this interpretation, the Court allowed the appeal and discharged the male accused who had been sent to trial for alleged wrongful restraint, voyeurism and criminal intimidation after he purportedly stopped a woman from entering a disputed property and recorded her images on his phone, which she claimed invaded her privacy and affronted her modesty, holding that the criminal proceedings could not continue on the material placed on record.

On 19 March 2020, the complainant, claiming to be a tenant of one of the co-owners of a residential property in Salt Lake, Kolkata, lodged an FIR alleging that on 18 March 2020, when she, her friend and workmen attempted to enter the premises, the appellant-accused restrained and intimidated them. She further alleged that he clicked her photographs and recorded videos on his mobile phone without her consent, which she stated intruded upon her privacy and outraged her modesty. The FIR invoked Sections 341, 354C and 506 of the IPC.

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After investigation, a chargesheet dated 16 August 2020 was filed for the same offences. It recorded that no photographs or videos were seized and that the complainant had expressed unwillingness to make a judicial statement. A prior civil suit between the appellant-accused’s father and the other co-owner over the same property was pending, with an injunction directing joint possession and restraining creation of third-party interests.

The appellant-accused contended that the FIR was a consequence of this civil dispute, that the complainant was not a tenant, that no material substantiated voyeurism, and that there were no statements from her friend or workmen and no statement under Section 164 CrPC. The State argued that the complainant was at least a prospective tenant, relied on the co-owner’s statement, and maintained that there was prima facie material for offences under Sections 341 and 506 IPC.

The Court, outlining the standard at the discharge stage, observed: “Consequently, at the stage of discharge, a strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be found on some material which can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial.”

On the offence of voyeurism, it stated: “Section 354C of IPC defines voyeurism as an act of a man watching or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a ‘private act’ in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed. ‘Private act’ has been defined in Explanation 1 as an act including ‘an act of watching carried out in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy and where the victim's genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the victim is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public.’” The Court held: “Upon a perusal of the FIR and chargesheet on record, this Court is unable to conclude the same disclose an offence under Section 354C of the IPC since there is no allegation in the FIR and chargesheet that the complainant was watched or captured by the Appellant-accused while she was engaging in a ‘private act’.”

Referring to the High Court’s finding, it noted: “Allegation made in the written complaint, in my opinion, did not disclose any offence under Section 354C…” and “From the bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clearly intelligible that the allegation of clicking pictures and making video made in the written complaint cannot be said to be an offence within the meaning of Section 354C of IPC.”

On criminal intimidation, the Court recorded: “Further, in order to constitute an offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 of IPC, it must be shown that the person charged, threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm.” and “Except for the bald allegation that the Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her photographs, the FIR and chargesheet are completely silent about the manner in which the complainant was threatened with any injury to her person or her property.” concluding that “even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at face value, the ingredients of offence of criminal intimidation are not attracted.”

Addressing wrongful restraint, the Court quoted Section 339 IPC: “Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person. Exception— The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section.’” and observed: “Therefore, the material on record indicates that on the date of the alleged offence, the complainant had no right to enter the property.” It added: “In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that all that the Appellant-accused did was to enforce what he bonafidely thought was his lawful right over the property in terms of the injunction order passed by the Trial Court.”

Finally, on the role of investigative and trial authorities, the Court stated: “The Police at the stage of filing of Chargesheet and the Criminal Court at the stage of framing of Charge must act as initial filters ensuring that only cases with a strong suspicion should proceed to the formal trial stage to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system. The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system.”

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The Court directed: “Consequently, this Court is of the view that criminal proceedings against the Appellant-accused for offences punishable under Sections 341, 354C, 506 of IPC cannot be permitted to continue.”

“Keeping in view the aforesaid, the present Appeal is allowed and the impugned Judgment and Order is set aside as well as the Appellant-accused is discharged from G.R. Case No. 223 of 2020 (arising out of Bidhannagar North Police Station FIR No. 50 of 2020).”

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioners: Mr. V. Somnath Ghoshal, Adv. (argued by) Anupama Chakraborty, Adv. Mr. Sahid Uddin Ahmed, Adv. Mr. Towseef Ahmad Dar, AOR Ms. Zinat Sultana, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. Kunal Mimani, AOR(argued by) Mr. Prashant Alai, Adv.

Case Title: Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba versus The State of West Bengal
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1373
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 5146 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3002/2024)
Bench: Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, Justice Manmohan