Sanchayita Lahkar

The High Court of Delhi Division Bench of Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar has set aside an order of the Lokpal of India directing a probe into alleged irregularities in recruitment and promotions at the National Productivity Council, holding that the oversight body had pre-judged the matter. The Court quashed the direction for inquiry and the notices issued to the concerned public servants because the Lokpal had recorded a prima facie view without first hearing them. Noting that Section 20(3) of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 requires the Lokpal to give an opportunity of hearing, then decide on the existence of a prima facie case and only thereafter order investigation, the Bench left it open to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

The petition was filed under Article 226 challenging the order dated 06.01.2025 issued by the Lokpal of India and the consequential notices dated 07.01.2025 issued under Section 20(3) of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act. The complaint dated 04.07.2024 alleged irregularities in recruitment and promotions within the National Productivity Council, including violations of service rules, breaches of guidelines, irregular promotions, and non-implementation of recommendations of a High-Power Committee. The Lokpal directed a preliminary inquiry by the CBI, which submitted its report on 20.09.2024 along with documents, witness statements, and comments from public servants and the competent authority. After receiving further observations, the Lokpal passed the impugned order and issued notices under Section 20(3).

Also Read: Divorced Muslim Woman Entitled To Recover Cash And Gold Given To Husband At Marriage Under Section 3(1) Of Muslim Women (Protection Of Rights On Divorce) Act: Supreme Court

The petitioners contended that the Lokpal had recorded a prima facie opinion without granting them an opportunity of being heard, that no offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act had been disclosed, and that the complaint contained only procedural irregularities. The respondent argued that the notices were merely show-cause notices and the writ petition was premature. The Court examined the statutory scheme of Section 20, the sequence of preliminary inquiry, and the requirement of hearing before forming prima facie satisfaction.

The Court recorded that Section 20(3) requires the Lokpal to “after giving an opportunity of being heard to the public servant, decide whether there exists a prima facie case”. It stated that the statutory sequence mandates that the hearing must occur before the prima facie opinion is reached.

The Court referred to the impugned order and observed that the Lokpal had already used language that “prima facie, these allegations need further probe” and that the material “suggests that a deeper probe is required to unearth the real cause for such hushing up the illegality bordering on corruption”. The Court recorded that such remarks demonstrated crystallisation of opinion before issuing notice.

It further quoted the statutory principle that where a statute prescribes a manner, “it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner”. It relied on the judgment noting that the requirement of hearing is mandatory and stated: “Omission of this step… constitutes a violation of the statutory mandate and of the Principles of Natural Justice.”

The Court recorded that suspicion or assertions “bordering on corruption” do not satisfy the statutory threshold because a prima facie finding must relate to the actual existence of an offence. It stated that “the expression bordering on corruption is neither here nor there.”

The Court noted the mandatory safeguards, observing that the Lokpal is “duty-bound to act in strict conformity with the procedure prescribed by law”, and that failure to adhere to safeguards “strikes at the very root of administrative fairness and justice.” It held that the Lokpal issued notices only after recording definitive findings. It stated that “the failure to adhere to this statutory precondition vitiates the very substratum of the impugned action.”

Finally, it clarified that although the petitioners had also challenged the jurisdiction of the Lokpal, the Court would not examine the Lokpal’s later order dated 04.03.2025 rejecting that objection.

Also Read: Delhi High Court Dismisses Amylin–AstraZeneca Appeal And Upholds Patent Refusal For Exenatide Sustained-Release Diabetes Injection

The Court held that the impugned order and notices were “in violation of the statutory requirement of affording a fair hearing to the concerned RPSs under Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act. The present Writ Petition is allowed, and the Impugned Order dated 06.01.2025, along with the consequential Notices dated 07.01.2025, insofar as they concern the Petitioners, are quashed and set aside.”

“It is, however, made clear that the learned Lokpal shall be at liberty, if it so chooses, to proceed against the Petitioners, in accordance with law, strictly adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 20 of the Lokpal Act.” The petition and pending applications were disposed of with “No Order as to costs.”

Advocates Representing The Parties

For the Petitioners: Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Advocate; Mr. Varun Singh, Ms. Deepeika Kalia, Ms. Kajal Gupta, Ms. Somesa Gupta, Advocates.

For the Respondent: Mr. Nishant R. Katneshwarkar and Mr. Vijay Singh, Advocates.

Case Title: Rajesh Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Lokpal of India
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:10574-DB
Case Number: W.P.(C) 1264/2025
Bench: Justice Anil Kshetrapal, Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar