Supreme Court Sets Aside Bombay HC's Contempt Sentence Order On Woman For ‘Dog Mafia’ Remarks Against Judges
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta today set aside, to the extent of sentence, a Bombay High Court order that had imposed one week’s simple imprisonment and a fine on a woman for criminal contempt arising from her “dog mafia” remarks directed at the Supreme Court and the High Court and their judges. Observing that the appellant, a former office-bearer of a residential society engaged in litigation over animal birth control measures, had expressed remorse from the stage of the show-cause notice and tendered an unconditional apology, the Court held that the conditions for remission of punishment were satisfied and directed that the custodial sentence be remitted, interfering only with the punishment imposed.
The appeal before the Supreme Court arises from suo motu criminal contempt proceedings initiated by the Bombay High Court in the backdrop of a writ petition filed by a housing society challenging Rule 20 of the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023. The appellant, a former cultural director of the society, was alleged by an intervenor to have issued a circular dated 29 January 2025. The circular referred to a “dog mafia” with influence in the judiciary, alleged that High Court and Supreme Court judges favoured dog feeders over human safety, and criticised an order dated 20 March 2023 said to be implemented through local authorities and police.
The High Court treated the circular as contemptuous, sought clarification whether it represented the society or the individual, and, based on the society’s affidavit, proceeded only against the appellant. In her reply affidavit, the appellant accepted that issuing the circular was an error, attributed it to pressure from residents, stated she had resigned from the board, and expressed remorse. The High Court then examined whether the contents amounted to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and considered the applicability of Section 12 on punishment, leading to the present appeal under Section 19(1)(b) of the Act.
The Court observed: "The power to punish necessarily carries within it the concomitant power to forgive, where the individual before the Court demonstrates genuine remorse and repentance for the act that has brought him to this position." It added that "in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, Courts must remain conscious that this power is not a personal armour for Judges, nor a sword to silence criticism" and that "Mercy, therefore, must remain an integral part of the judicial conscience, to be extended where the contemnor sincerely acknowledges his lapse and seeks to atone for it."
Recording the High Court’s assessment, the Bench noted that it had held the act of issuing the circular "cannot be categorized as fair criticism as the same was issued with an intent to scandalize the Court" and that "it is not expected from an educated person like that of the contemnor to make such comments in regard to the Courts and the Judges of the higher Courts like the Supreme Court and the High Courts… shows a dedicated attempt, a well thought of design calculated to bring the Court and the Judges to a disrepute and intended to tarnish the judicial system so as to interfere with the due course of justice and administration of law by the courts with impunity."
On Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the Court stated: "While an act may amount to contempt, the proviso to Section 12 of the Contempt Act empowers the Court to discharge the contemnor or remit the punishment awarded." It further held: "The Explanation to Section 12 further clarifies that an apology shall not be rejected merely because it is qualified or conditional, if it is made bona fide. The statutory scheme, therefore, recognises that once a contemnor expresses sincere remorse, even if the apology is not unqualified in form, the Court is competent to accept it and, where necessary, discharge the contemnor or remit the sentence imposed."
On precedents, the Bench stated: "In Dr. D.C. Saxena (supra) and Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. (supra), the contemnors had not offered any apology. In Roshan Lal Ahuja (supra), the apology initially tendered was later withdrawn. In Rajendra Sail (supra), though an unconditional apology was offered, this Court declined to accept it in view of the gravity of the allegations, which included imputations made in a public rally that a sitting Judge had been bribed and possessed assets disproportionate to income. The factual matrix of the present case is materially distinct, and therefore, the precedents relied upon could not have been applied as a basis to record the conviction or justify the sentence imposed upon the appellant-contemnor."
Applying these principles, the Court recorded: "At the outset, while we are satisfied that the contemptuous circular does satisfy the essential ingredients of criminal contempt, we find ourselves unable to concur with the reasoning adopted by the High Court in invoking Section 12 of Contempt Act to impose punishment upon the appellant-contemnor" and concluded: "Thus, in our opinion, in the absence of any material suggesting that the apology was lacking in bona fides, the High Court ought to have considered remitting the sentence in accordance with law."
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The Court held: "In light of the foregoing discussion, we summarise our conclusions as under:"
"i. The reliance placed by the High Court on the decisions of this Court in Dr. DC Saxena (supra), Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. (supra), Roshan Lal Ahuja, In re (supra), and Rajendra Sail (supra) is misplaced, as the material facts in those cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present matter."
"ii. Considering that the appellant-contemnor has, from the very outset, expressed genuine remorse and repentance for issuing the contemptuous circular, we are satisfied that the ends of justice would be met by remitting the sentence imposed by the High Court."
"Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 23rd April, 2025, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Suo Motu Criminal Contempt Petition No. 2 of 2025 is hereby set aside to the aforesaid extent. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of."
Case Title: Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its own motion
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1408
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 2267 of 2025
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta
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