Supreme Court Sets Aside Madras HC Direction For DNA Profiling; Says Ordering Test Without Nexus To Offence Or Mere To Explore Paternity Is Unwarranted
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India, Division Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi held that a DNA test cannot be ordered merely to explore possibilities of paternity, particularly when such a step could undermine the legal presumption of legitimacy of a child born within marriage and infringe upon the privacy of those involved. Setting aside the Madras High Court’s direction for DNA profiling of a doctor in a criminal case involving allegations of cheating and harassment, the Court stated that scientific methods like DNA analysis are not to be used for speculative purposes. It clarified that such testing is permissible only in exceptional situations where it is indispensable for determining facts essential to the investigation.
The dispute arose from criminal proceedings initiated by a woman against a doctor, alleging cheating and harassment. The complainant was married in 2001 to a man suffering from a skin ailment who sought medical treatment from the appellant doctor. During the course of treatment, the doctor developed a physical relationship with the complainant, which resulted in the birth of a child in 2007. It was alleged that the relationship continued even after the child’s birth, following which her husband deserted her. Subsequently, the complainant approached a television programme and made her allegations public, leading to the registration of a First Information Report under Sections 417 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Women Harassment Act.
During investigation, the police applied before the Judicial Magistrate seeking a direction to collect blood samples of the appellant, the complainant, and the child for DNA profiling. The appellant did not comply with the direction. The complainant then filed writ petitions before the Madras High Court seeking a transfer of investigation and an order for DNA testing. The Single Judge directed DNA profiling of the parties, and the Division Bench affirmed the direction, requiring the appellant to appear before the hospital authorities.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that DNA testing could not be ordered as a matter of course, that such directions infringed upon the right to privacy, and that Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act conclusively presumed legitimacy of a child born during a valid marriage. It was further argued that the child’s certificates named the complainant’s husband as father, negating the need for DNA testing. The respondent argued that DNA analysis was essential for determining the truth in the criminal investigation and that privacy could be waived by consent. Reliance was placed on judicial precedents permitting scientific evidence to establish paternity where necessary.
The Court observed that the issue for determination was “whether the High Court was justified in directing the appellant to undergo DNA testing.” It stated that Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act provides “conclusive proof of the legitimacy of a child born during the continuance of a valid marriage unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.”
The Bench recorded that “the presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act operates as conclusive proof of the legitimacy of a child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage.” It further stated that “this presumption endures unless it is affirmatively established, by strong and unambiguous evidence, that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten.”
Citing Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, the Court observed that “courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter of course” and that “no one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.” Referring to Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women, it stated that “DNA test in a matter relating to paternity of a child should not be directed by the Court as a matter of course or in a routine manner, whenever such a request is made.”
The Court recorded that “no material has been placed on record by respondent No.1 to substantiate her claim of desertion, which remains a bare assertion unsupported by any evidence.” It noted that “the birth certificate, school transfer certificate, and school admission record each record the name of Abdul Latheef as the father of the child.” It added that “mere simultaneous access does not negate the husband’s access, nor does it suffice to displace the statutory presumption under Section 112.”
Addressing privacy concerns, the Court stated that “forcefully subjecting an individual to DNA testing constitutes a grave intrusion upon privacy and personal liberty.” Referring to K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, it recorded that “an invasion of privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable.” It further noted that “there exists no legitimate aim that necessitates such an intrusive procedure, since the criminal allegations of cheating and harassment can be investigated and adjudicated on the strength of other evidence.”
The Court observed that “Section 112 embodies a legislative policy of profound significance, it stands as a bulwark against the casual illegitimization of children on the strength of unsubstantiated allegations or mere suspicion. The presumption it creates is not a procedural formality to be lightly displaced but a substantive safeguard intended to protect the dignity, social legitimacy, and the legal rights of children born within wedlock.”
The Court further held that “In summation, the direction for DNA testing, as affirmed by the Division Bench, rests upon the fundamental misapprehension of both statutory framework and constitutional safeguards. The offences alleged, falling under Sections 417 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Women Harassment Act, are neither of nature nor of a circumstance that warrant recourse to DNA analysis. The High Court’s invocation of Sections 53 and 53A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, rests on a misconstruction of their contextual ambit; these provisions contemplate medical examination only where such an examination may directly yield evidence relating to commission of the alleged offence. Absent that nexus, compulsion of a DNA test transforms a lawful investigative power into an intrusive measure devoid of necessity, trenching upon the individual’s bodily autonomy, privacy. Scientific procedures, however advanced, cannot be employed as instruments of speculation; they must be anchored in demonstrable relevance to the charge and justified by compelling investigative need.”
The Court stated: “Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 10.05.2017 passed by the High Court in Writ Appeal (MD) No.521 of 2017 is set aside. The statutory presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act remains unrebutted, and the child continues to be, in the eyes of the law, the legitimate offspring of Abdul Latheef. The Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: Mr. Pulkit Tare, Adv. Mr. Sheikh F. Kalia, Adv. Mr. D.Kumanan, Adv. Mr. Ashwary Kathed, Adv. Mr. Suvendu Suvasis Dash, AOR
For the Respondents: Mr. Ankur Prakash, AOR Mr. M.P. Parthiban, Adv. Mr. Balaji Subramanian, A.A.G. Mr. Sabarish Subramanian, AOR Mr. Danish Saifi, Adv. Mr. Akash Kundu, Adv.
Case Title: R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1304
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No.1013 of 2021
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
