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“High Speed Alone Does Not Prove Rashness”: Delhi HC Acquits Driver in Fatal Accident, Slams Lower Courts for Overlooking ‘Vital Evidence’ and Relying on Presumption

“High Speed Alone Does Not Prove Rashness”: Delhi HC Acquits Driver in Fatal Accident, Slams Lower Courts for Overlooking ‘Vital Evidence’ and Relying on Presumption

Safiya Malik

 

The Delhi High Court, Single Bench of Justice Saurabh Banerjee set aside the conviction of an individual charged under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court held that driving at a high speed, without conclusive evidence of rash or negligent conduct, cannot sustain a conviction under these provisions. The petitioner, who was sentenced to 18 months of rigorous imprisonment for causing the death of two pedestrians, has been discharged.

 

The petitioner was convicted by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-06 (South), Saket Courts, New Delhi on 03.09.2019, for offences under Sections 279 and 304A IPC, with a sentence dated 16.09.2019. This order was upheld by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-07 (South), Saket Courts, New Delhi on 03.12.2022, though the sentence was reduced from 24 to 18 months of rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner then approached the High Court of Delhi under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

 

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The incident occurred on 20.02.2012 at approximately 6:45 AM in front of Kamla Nehru College Bus Stand, August Kranti Road. A Swift Dzire car, bearing registration number DL-2C-AL-7285, driven by the petitioner, allegedly struck two pedestrians, Sultan Singh and Raja @ Raghu Verma, who later succumbed to injuries. The First Information Report was registered under Sections 279/304A IPC at Police Station Hauz Khas, Delhi.

 

According to the prosecution, the petitioner, employed as a cleaner by one Ms. Isha Shrivastava (the car owner), was allegedly persuaded by five friends to take the vehicle for a joyride. On the return journey, while taking a turn, the car allegedly lost control, struck the pedestrians, and collided with the footpath. Subsequently, all individuals in the vehicle left the scene in a local bus, failing to assist the injured.

 

In response to a notice under Section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the vehicle owner stated that the petitioner had taken the car without her consent or knowledge. A charge sheet dated 30.06.2012 was filed, followed by charges framed under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. The petitioner was convicted by the Metropolitan Magistrate and sentenced accordingly.

 

The petitioner’s counsel submitted that the conviction was erroneously based on the assumption that high speed equates to rash or negligent driving. Citing precedents including Syad Akbar vs State of Karnataka (1980), State of Karnataka vs Satish (1998), Ram Chander vs State (2017), and Abdul Shubhan vs State (NCT of Delhi) (2006), counsel argued that no prosecution witness explicitly deposed that the petitioner was driving in a rash or negligent manner.

 

Further, it was submitted that the Seizure Memo (EX. PW5/B) and Mechanical Inspection Report (EX. A4) indicated damage to the vehicle’s tyres, suggesting a possible tyre burst as the cause of the accident. The author of the mechanical report was not examined during trial, leaving gaps in the investigation regarding the exact timing and cause of the damage.

 

The petitioner also argued that the learned ASJ erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to fill evidentiary gaps and failed to consider mitigating factors such as the petitioner’s young age, lack of criminal antecedents, and family responsibilities.

 

On the other hand, the Additional Public Prosecutor for the State submitted that testimonies of prosecution witnesses clearly identified the petitioner as the driver and that the vehicle was being driven at a very high speed, leading to loss of control and fatalities. The prosecution relied on the site plan and post-mortem reports to establish causation.

 

The court examined the testimonies of PW1 to PW4 and recorded: "though all of them deposed that the petitioner was driving the Car at a "high speed", however, neither of them deposed that the petitioner was driving the Car in a "rash and negligent manner."

 

The court further observed: "this Court does not find any evidence on record which reflects that the petitioner was indeed driving the Car in a "rash and negligent manner."

 

Regarding the issue of tyre damage, the judgment stated: "the condition of the Car was very poor and both the left side front and rear suspension tyre/ tube/ rim were found damaged. Therefore, under such circumstances, it cannot be conclusively ascertained that the petitioner was indeed driving the Car in a "rash and negligent manner."

 

The court found fault in the lower courts’ reliance on the high speed of the vehicle as a determinant of negligence. Citing State of Karnataka vs Satish, the judgment recorded: "Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself... High speed is a relative term... the burden of proving everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution."

 

The court held that essential ingredients of Sections 279 and 304A IPC—rashness and negligence—were not established beyond reasonable doubt. It recorded: "There being an overall infirmity and unfilled lacunae in the case set up by the prosecution... the prosecution was not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt."

 

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The court concluded that: "Since the issues/ acts involved do not fall within the precincts of Section(s) 279/ 304A of the IPC, the petitioner cannot be held guilty of a "rash and negligent" act."

 

Accordingly, the judgment stated: "The present revision petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 03.12.2022... is set aside. Consequently, both the order of conviction dated 03.09.2019 and order of sentence dated 16.09.2019... are also set aside."

 

"The petitioner is thus discharged under Section(s) 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860."

 

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioner: Mr. Siddhant Buxy, Ms. Rupinder Kaur

For the Respondent: Mr. Satish Kumar, Additional Public Prosecutor

 

Case Title: Manish Kumar vs State of NCT Delhi

Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:2169

Case Number: CRL.REV. P. 873/2022

Bench: Justice Saurabh Banerjee

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