"Treating Suspension as Duty Requires Explicit Directive from Authority" ; Suspension Period Must Be Settled in Accordance with FR 54-B (1)(11) and FR 54(5): Madras High Court
- Post By 24law
- April 2, 2025

Safiya Malik
The Division Bench of the Madras High Court comprising Justice R. Subramanian and Justice G. Arul Murugan, set aside a single bench order which had directed the authorities to treat the suspension and removal periods of a police constable as periods spent on duty. The appeal was filed by the police department challenging the order passed in a writ petition related to the service of a traffic constable.
The Bench stated that in the absence of specific directions from the competent authority or appellate authority treating the suspension and non-duty period as duty, such periods cannot automatically be converted into duty periods. The judgment clarified the correct interpretation and application of Fundamental Rules 54 and 54-B in cases involving disciplinary actions and subsequent reinstatements.
The respondent, D. Sathiyaseelan, was initially appointed as a Grade-II Constable on 25.10.1984. While serving in the R-4 Pondy Bazaar Traffic Police Station, Chennai, he went on medical leave starting from 20.04.1995. Without obtaining prior permission, he left headquarters and allegedly participated in a criminal act involving abduction and robbery on 24.05.1995.
A criminal case was registered against him and four others under Section 395 IPC by the Eranial Police Station, and he was remanded to judicial custody. Consequently, he was placed under suspension effective from 24.05.1995.
Disciplinary proceedings were initiated under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. The charges were:
- Gross neglect of duty by leaving the headquarters without prior permission;
- Reprehensible conduct in forcibly robbing a bus passenger of Rs.60,300 on 24.05.1995.
Following an order by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, the respondent was reinstated into service on 31.05.2000. An enquiry was conducted, resulting in a report finding the charges proved. Based on this, the disciplinary authority issued an order on 25.10.2005 dismissing the respondent from service. An appeal against this was rejected on 16.12.2005.
The respondent challenged the dismissal in W.P. No. 314 of 2006. The court set aside the punishment on 20.04.2009, observing that the criminal case had ended in acquittal. The matter was remanded to the disciplinary authority, which reimposed the dismissal on 11.06.2009. A second writ petition (W.P. No. 14937 of 2009) was filed, and the court once again set aside the punishment on 24.03.2010, directing the appellate authority to rehear the case.
On the second remand, by order dated 20.08.2010, the appellate authority modified the punishment from dismissal to reduction in pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect. The respondent rejoined duty on 27.08.2010.
Subsequently, the competent authority issued a show cause notice dated 01.11.2013, proposing to treat the suspension period (24.05.1995 to 31.05.2000) and the removal period (25.10.2005 to 26.08.2010) as leave. The respondent replied on 16.11.2013. The department, via order dated 31.01.2014, treated the time periods as:
- 05.1995 to 31.05.2000 - 1835 days as Leave Without Pay (LWP);
- 10.2005 to 31.03.2006 - 158 days as Earned Leave (EL);
- 04.2006 to 26.08.2010 - 1589 days as Leave Without Pay (LWP).
Challenging this order, the respondent filed a writ petition. The single bench directed the entire period to be treated as duty based on Fundamental Rule 54-B(1)(9), prompting the department to file the present intra-court appeal.
The Division Bench recorded that the respondent was not fully exonerated in the departmental proceedings, even though he was acquitted in the criminal case. The court noted:
"Even though the respondent was acquitted from the criminal case, still he has not been exonerated from the charges in the disciplinary proceedings, but however, only the punishment was modified."
It was observed that while modifying the punishment, the appellate authority had not issued any direction treating the suspension or removal period as duty. Hence, the competent authority was within its rights to settle those periods as leave.
Regarding the applicability of Rule 54-B(1)(9), the Bench clarified:
"Sub-rule (9) only deals with a situation in case where the delinquent was placed under suspension only as a criminal complaint was pending or the dismissal or removal from service was due to the conviction on criminal charge but subsequently reinstated on acquittal."
It was held that the case at hand falls under Rule 54-B(1)(11), which requires specific orders from competent or appellate authority treating the suspension as duty in situations where both departmental and criminal proceedings are involved.
On the period post-dismissal (25.10.2005 to 26.08.2010), the court recorded:
"In such circumstances, the entire period of suspension and also the period of absence from duty is covered by sub-rule (5) and as per the proviso, the competent authority has passed the order by settling those periods by converting them into leave, both under loss of pay and also earned leave as per the eligibility due and admissible to the respondent."
The court found the single bench's reliance on Rule 54-B(1)(9) to be misplaced and contrary to the governing provisions of Rule 54(5) and 54-B(1)(11).
The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal and set aside the order of the single bench. It restored the departmental order dated 31.01.2014, settling the disputed periods as leave without pay and earned leave as applicable.
The Bench stated:
"It is made clear that for those periods the respondent will be deemed to be in continuity of service, for calculating pensionary benefits."
The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs. The connected miscellaneous petition was closed.
Advocates Representing the Parties
For Appellants: P. Kumaresan, Additional Advocate General, assisted by S. Anitha, Special Government Pleader
For Respondent: L. Chandrakumar
Case Title: The Commissioner of Police, Greater Chennai Police and Others vs D. Sathiyaseelan
Neutral Citation: 2025: MHC:855
Case Number: W.A. No. 26 of 2024 and C.M.P. No. 187 of 2024
Bench: Justice R. Subramanian and Justice G. Arul Murugan
[Read/Download order]
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