Wipro Held Liable For Defamation In Termination Letter | Delhi High Court Awards ₹2 Lakh Damages For Reputational Harm In Private Employment
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Delhi Single Bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav has held that a termination letter issued by a private employer containing unsubstantiated and stigmatic allegations constitutes actionable civil defamation. The Court directed that defamatory content in the impugned termination letter be expunged and a fresh discharge letter be issued devoid of such remarks. The Court further awarded general compensatory damages of Rs. 2,00,000 to the plaintiff, citing the employer’s failure to establish truth or any valid defence in relation to the defamatory statements. While holding that the contract of employment was determinable and specific performance was not maintainable, the Court stated in favour of the plaintiff on the issue of defamation. The suit was accordingly partly decreed.
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant company as a Principal Consultant from 14 March 2018 until his termination on 5 June 2020. The employment contract, specifically Clause 10, permitted either party to terminate the engagement without assigning reasons, subject to a notice period or payment in lieu.
On 5 June 2020, the defendant issued a termination letter through its authorized representative. The letter invoked Clause 10 of the employment contract and terminated the plaintiff with immediate effect. It further stated: "We were compelled to take this difficult decision on account of a complete loss of trust and confidence between us due to your actions and malicious conduct in the past weeks."
Aggrieved by this, the plaintiff instituted a civil suit seeking, inter alia, damages of Rs. 2.1 crore for alleged defamation, a direction to issue a new discharge letter, and a letter of apology. He contended that the statements in the termination letter were contrary to the employment contract, devoid of substantiation, and had severely damaged his professional reputation.
In his submissions, the plaintiff, appearing in person, argued that the letter used defamatory and baseless phrases such as "malicious conduct" and "loss of trust". He stated that he was denied an opportunity to respond to or defend himself against these accusations, and that the absence of any evidence to support the allegations rendered the termination arbitrary. He contended that the remarks had rendered him unemployable and violated his right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The plaintiff placed reliance on decisions such as S.P. Sharma v. IFCI Ltd., Himanshu Bhatt v. IRCTC, and Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical Association to assert that stigmatic terminations adversely affect professional standing and can amount to defamation.
The defendant entered appearance and filed a written statement denying the allegations. It contended that the termination letter was issued in conformity with the employment contract and reflected the employer's perception of the plaintiff’s conduct. The defendant submitted that no third-party dissemination of the letter had occurred and hence, no defamation could be made out.
It further argued that the plaintiff, being in a managerial role, was unable to meet performance expectations and had acknowledged his lack of fit within the team in internal communications. He was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) and had continued to raise grievances instead of improving performance. The defendant stated that the termination decision was internal, justified, and communicated only to the plaintiff, without publication to any third party.
Both parties led evidence. The plaintiff examined himself and another witness. The defendant examined one witness. The record included employment documents, internal communications, performance appraisals, email correspondences, and policies. The defendant did not dispute the employment contract or the termination letter.
The Court framed four issues: whether the termination violated the contract, whether the statements in the letter were defamatory, whether the termination caused damage, and the appropriate relief. The plaintiff produced documents showing consistent positive performance ratings and favourable appraisals.
The Court observed that "Clause 10, under the consideration herein, squarely fits within the aforementioned legal construct, as it empowers the employer to bring the employment relationship to a cessation solely upon notice or, alternatively, upon payment of salary in lieu thereof" and held the contract to be determinable in nature.
It was recorded that "in the present factual matrix, where the employment contract is unequivocally determinable at the discretion of either party in accordance with its express terms, the remedy available to the plaintiff is only confined to compensatory relief in the form of liquidated damages" and reinstatement or specific performance was not available.
However, on the issue of defamation, the Court held that defamatory content in termination letters, even if communicated privately, may amount to defamation if compelled disclosure to prospective employers is a foreseeable consequence.
The Court stated: "Any act that infringes this right is often termed as defamatory" and outlined the four requirements of civil defamation: false and defamatory imputation, publication, reference to the plaintiff, and absence of valid defence.
It held that the expressions "malicious conduct" and "complete loss of trust" in the termination letter were unsubstantiated and in conflict with the plaintiff’s documented appraisals, stating: "These records uniformly reflect the feedback on the high degree of performance of the plaintiff...".
The Court further stated: "The unwarranted allegations, resting on no substantiated basis, have undoubtedly cast a long shadow over the professional standing of the plaintiff" and "the terms used in the termination letter, without any material basis, have the effect of clouding the professional commitment, ethics, and competence of the petitioner in the eyes of others".
On publication, it was noted: "The foreseeable circulation of the impugned termination letter, through compelled disclosure by the plaintiff, satisfies the requirement of publication" and "the plaintiff would be left with no alternative but to disclose the impugned termination letter to prospective employers".
Rejecting the employer’s plea of confidentiality, the Court said: "Such disclosure, being a foreseeable and natural consequence of incorporating the defamatory remarks in the impugned termination letter, renders the act actionable in law".
In terms of damages, the Court recorded: "The law, ordinarily speaking, does not favour punitive or exemplary damages in routine defamation claims, and instead focuses on providing reasonable compensation". It further observed that compensation must take into account "the gravity of the libel, extent of publication, effect of the libel on personal integrity, professional honour..." and held that "the calculation of compensation on this principle takes into account a myriad set of circumstances...".
Citing Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy, John v. MGN Ltd., and Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, the Court reiterated the principle of general compensatory damages for defamation.
The Court directed that the remarks made in the termination letter with respect to the professional character of the plaintiff be expunged. It further ordered that a fresh termination letter be issued to the plaintiff, "devoid of any defamatory content".
The Court recorded: "The impugned termination letter shall cease to be of any effect insofar as the defamatory content is concerned".
It also directed: "This Court deems it just and proper to award a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- as general compensatory damages to the plaintiff, to redress the reputational harm, emotional hardship, and loss of professional credibility occasioned by the conduct of the defendant".
Clarifying the scope of its order, the Court stated: "The issuance of a fresh letter and expungement of remarks shall not alter the decision of termination of the petitioner in any manner whatsoever".
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Abhijit Mishra, plaintiff in person
For the Defendant: Mr. Mandeep Singh Vinaik, Ms. Ragini Vinaik, and Mr. Gaikhuanlung, Advocates
Case Title: Abhijit Mishra v. Wipro Limited
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:5678
Case Number: CS(OS) 31/2021
Bench: Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
